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When Diplomats Boo: How Global Climate Talks Reached a New Nadir
But having diplomats boo each other would seem to indicate a new nadir, not a new peak, in climate negotiations.

The Bali global warming talks ended in nothing, but that didn't stop European leaders from pointing to the bright side: the U.S. was booed.

Here's Wash Post:

"As we saw in the room today, the political price for blocking things has come up in recent months," said Connie Hedegaard, the Danish climate and energy minister, whose government will host the 2009 treaty talks.

Hedegaard was referring to boos the U.S. representative got after rejecting emissions reductions goals and timetables.

But having diplomats boo each other would seem to indicate a new nadir, not a new peak, in climate negotiations. (At least WWF's climate head was honest, acknowledging that, "in the process, we lost substance.")

The truth is that those countries that ratified Kyoto haven't any more reduced their emissions than the U.S. Those countries that have did so for reasons other than global warming (coal miner's strike in the UK and collapse of East Germany industry after reunification). EU leaders will try to show a decline in total emissions by counting those emissions that Russia would have brought on line had its economy not tanked after the fall of Communism.

Ham-handed statistical manipulations aside, the whole post-Kyoto conversation is moot without China. Roger Pielke just posted some fascinating China numbers comparing the expected increase in China's emissions to developed nations. Here's Pielke's run-up:

The growth in China's emissions from 2006-2010 is equivalent to adding the 2004 emissions of Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia to China's 2006 total (source). The emissions growth in China at these rates is like adding another Germany every year, or a UK and Australia together, to global emissions. The graph below illustrates the point.

And now for the graph -- hold on to your hat.

China%20Emissions.png
(GtC = gigatons of carbon)

None of this is to "blame China." Just the opposite: it's to show why Kyoto is irrelevant in the context of the emissions China will bring on line. Here's the Times' Andy Revkin on why the developing world matters in the context of climate change:

Richard Richels, an economist at the Electric Power Research Institute, helped produce an ominous forecast: even if the established industrial powers turned off every power plant and car right now, unless there are changes in policy in poorer countries the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could still reach 450 parts per million -- a level deemed unacceptably dangerous by many scientists -- by 2070. (If no one does anything, that threshold is reached in 2040.)

Kyoto doesn't count as a country's emissions all of the stuff that we rich countries buy from China. China's emissions are skyrocketing in part because they are manufacturing like crazy in plants fueled by coal. Think about how much stuff we Americans own that is made in China. The emissions China generates manufacturing our stuff are as much ours as China's.

The two decade-old game of the U.S. blaming China and China the U.S. on climate change is a result of political leaders on both sides being unable to see the obvious best framework to accelerate the transition to clean energy: massive shared investments to buy down the price of clean energy sources like solar. If the U.S. and Europe each put $500 billion on the table over a decade to invest in various things -- from wind and solar to carbon capture, efficiency, and conservation -- you could likely attract some sort of an agreement from China to price carbon. China would stand to win a great deal of the clean energy manufacturing jobs, including most if not all solar panel production.

Kyoto has always had two big things wrong. First, it insisted on a global agreement when what's needed is one between a small number of large countries that will drive the clean energy technology through the global economy. This is the case that Oxford's Rayner and LSE's Prins brilliantly make in their famous "The Wrong Trousers" critique of Kyoto.

Second, Kyoto starts with regulation when it should have started with investment. Kyoto only works if it makes dirty energy expensive to make clean energy cost competitive and stimulate conservation and efficiency. Kyoto tries to get to investment through its Clean Development Fund. But it depends on the success of regulation.

A new, post-Kyoto agreement would focus resolutely on making clean energy cheaper than coal in China. And it would begin with investment -- $1 trillion or so on the table -- and end with agreements on regulation, perhaps even a multinational carbon tax, enforced through the WTO, which would be far easier to enforce than global cap and trade.

Happily, this agreement could be negotiated, and demanded, no matter what happens to the Kyoto protocol, which has not worked because it cannot work. Indeed, American scientists already are calling for something similar, at least in the U.S. Here's Revkin again:

Theories abound over how best to help China embrace emissions-reducing policies. One way, many scientists and scholars say, is to make nonpolluting energy sources cheaper than the unfettered burning of abundant fossil fuels. Right now they are far more expensive.

That is why several dozen top-flight climate and energy experts sent a letter this month to members of Congress and the presidential candidates seeking a tenfold rise in the federal budget for energy research, now about $3 billion a year. . . [Stanford researcher BinBin Jiang said,] "The U.S. is not going to be influential by telling China what to do. It has to lead by example."


6 COMMENTS:

It isn't sure that more investment in renewable energies and energy efficiency brings down carbon dioxid emissions. H.-W. Sinn argues it could be counterproductive. Read his Paper "Public Policy Against Global Warming".

This commentary is a tad breathless, and I don't know if you're going to make headway by referencing contrarians who are invited to write for the Cato Institute like Roger Pielke Jr.

The whole premise that "Kyoto is not going to solve our problems, therefore it is useless" is premised on the unspoken belief that others don't understand that Kyoto will not fix everything. If posted speed limits don't stop fast driving does that mean we drop all speed limits?

Of course not. Kyoto also has the effect of getting people to acknowledge there is a problem and commit to the long process (it will take decades!) of limiting emissions. It's a first step in that direction

To not acknowledge that point is less than honest.

I don't understand why this is considered to be such shocking news. Simple arithmetic is all that is necessary to calculate the numbers for China, or any other country.

As someone has said several times, "Those who refuse to do arithmetic are doomed to talk nonsense."

Thanks for responding guys.

1.

Steffen: I think Sinn is right that reducing demand for fossil fuels risks lowering their price in other countries -- thus increasing their consumption.

It is for this reason that, I believe, it is imperative that we cut the link between energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. And why we must get off fossil fuels as quickly as possibly.

Doing so, I further believe, requires a series of continuous technological breakthroughs to bring the price of things like solar to the price of coal in China as quickly as possible.

2.

Peter: I won't be taking you up on your suggestion that I not pay attention to people for having had their writings picked up by the Cato Institute. That's innuendo by association.

I think it's obvious my point was not that we should have no laws because laws get broken. Frankly, Peter, that's a pretty gnarly distortion of my post. What I was saying was that Kyoto can't work because of the way it's been structured.

It's not like Kyoto worked once and then was broken, or that the U.S. is the reason it hasn't worked in Europe. The real reason is that European policymakers didn't want to raise energy costs. Read Rayner and Prins' "The Wrong Trousers" and tell me why they're wrong.

You say, that Kyoto is "a first step in that direction. To not acknowledge that point is less than honest."

In other words, because we disagree, I am somehow being "less than honest." Nice.

Peter, there is an actual argument for why Kyoto has failed. I have made it, as have others, referred to in my post. I encourage you to conjure an actual rebuttal to that argument.

3.

Dan: Maybe the reason the China numbers scare me every time I see them is because I fear we have no way to stop them, even as I advocate that we try, if not for success then at least for the valiant effort.

"Those who refuse to do arithmetic are doomed to talk nonsense."

I begrudgingly agree, and admit that I suck at it, which is why I'm zestfully pillaging Roger's numbers!

In view of Sinn's observations about perverse effects of demand reduction for fossil fuels, I'm not sure I agree with Shellenberger's observation that what we need is an agreement of the big emitters rather than a global agreement. Even with massive investment in non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, there will probably need to be carbon taxation in some form (direct or indirectly through cap and trade or a hybrid cap + tax) to drive up costs of conventional energy sources. Even if research leads to technological breakthroughs, new technologies and processes will have to survive in the marketplace, be refined based on experience, and then widely adopted. I don't see how these final steps happen without a state-imposed increase in the cost of carbon-based fuels.

Other breakthrough technologies such as computer chips -- developed with massive public investments -- stepped into unfilled niches. These technologies did things that nothing existing at the time did. But new energy technologies will have to compete head-to-head with carbon fuels that are still cheap to extract from the ground. Thus I don't see how we get around having to develop some kind of global agreement, even if the architecture is very different from Kyoto. I hope I'm wrong about this because this is going to be difficult to achieve.

A related question: why has the cap-and-trade architecture remained so sticky, given the economists' very credible critique that under cap-and-trade, states never know what their compliance costs will be?

Hi Bill, here's what Frank Laird, an energy expert at University of Denver, said:

I have just taken a quick look tonight at his abstract and first couple of pages. The idea of achieving Pareto optimality seem fanciful to me. Establishing property rights to carbon and real, workable emissions trading is a lot harder than it seems; its not enough to assume that they will work. This is a very inefficient (non-Pareto) market, and that is not likely to change.

Also, I saw one statement that assumed a simple relationship between price and consumption, what these folks call the elasticity of demand. The elasticity function has to be established empirically, not assumed to be linear with a slope of one.

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