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Rebound Effect Archives
Where Energy 'Rebound' Really Matters
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Quick quiz: If you improve the productivity of energy use at a steel plant in China, will that plant save energy, or produce and sell more of its now-cheaper steel? If ultra-efficient lightbulbs spread across rural India, will we see energy consumption there decline or rise?
With about two-thirds of global energy consumed in the refinement and transport of energy and the production of goods and services and over 90 percent of growth in energy demand spurred by the so-called "Rise of the Rest" in the emerging economies, these two examples should be at the front of our minds as debate spreads across the blogosphere about rebound effects -- the economic dynamics by which energy efficiency improvements lead to a rebound in demand for now-more-efficient energy services (see an FAQ on rebound here).
Author and reporter David Owen's new book, The Conundrum has sparked this latest round of rebound debate (see e.g. Bryan Walsh, Matt Yglesias, and David Roberts). Much of this debate has (understandably) centered around some of the most readily understandable examples of rebound drawn from our personal experiences -- efficient cars, appliances, home electronics, etc.
Unfortunately, these examples of personal energy use in wealthy countries are also precisely the cases where rebound effects are the smallest, leading some observers of this debate to conclude rebound is a smaller deal that it truly is.
Witness the focus on the so-called "Prius Fallacy" which Time's Bryan Walsh describes as this:
[A]s we become more efficient at using energy, we can save money -- which then allows us to use more of that energy than we did before. Picture it this way: you trade in your gas-guzzling SUV for a new efficient hybrid, end up paying less per mile for gasoline, and use some of the savings to drive more than you did with the SUV. The efficiency has rebounded.
Its a good clear explanation of how rebound effects work, but unfortunately, it focuses on one of the sectors where rebound effects are smallest: consumer demand for end-use energy services in rich countries.
Continue reading "Energy Efficiency, 'Rebound,' and the Rise of the Rest" »
Breakthrough Senior Fellow and rebound effect expert Harry Saunders responds...
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By Dr. Harry Saunders, Breakthrough Institute Senior Fellow
Recent posts by the CO2 Scorecard group claim to have discredited the analysis on rebound effects in industrial sectors of the US economy presented in one of my recent papers--let me here call it "Saunders." The authors offer an analysis of their own said to "devastate" the results I have reported there. Herewith is my response.
The Stakes
It is worth reminding readers of the stakes here. The energy consumption forecasts relied on by the IPCC, the IEA and McKinsey ignore rebound effects, or--to be maximally generous--treat them very inadequately. To the extent ignoring rebound effects results in underestimates of future energy use, it means we have less time than is generally believed to devise climate change solutions. This is surely problematic, but no serious individual would dispute the contention that uncomfortable reality must always trump wishful thinking. I believe rebound effects are significant and quite large, and I believe the peer-reviewed literature, including my own extensive contributions to that literature, supports this view. Unfortunately.
And to be absolutely clear: energy efficiency is a good thing (for one thing increasing economic welfare) and must be aggressively pursued; this has always been my position. It's just that it may not deliver the large reductions in energy use many (including myself) would hope for.
Editors note: for more background and reading on rebound effects see...
Problems with the CO2 Scorecard Analysis
In light of the above, the CO2 Scorecard posts on this subject (1 and 2) are disappointing and disheartening. But they require a response, even if only to defend the honor of my fellow scholars in this field. A complete dissection of the CO2 Scorecard analysis would make this post too long. Rebound analysis, done properly, is a highly technical undertaking. The approach here is to show a handful of the serious problems with the authors' analysis by way of listing five points, with links to an appendix containing the technical foundation for these points. Those interested in further evaluating this foundation can link to the technical discussion; those interested only in the claims made here can skip the full technicalities. Either way, as you will see, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the authors of the CO2 Scorecard analysis are guessing at what they hope are problems with the Saunders analysis but then have not bothered to check if their guesses are actually right...
Continue reading "CO2 Scorecard Misrepresents and Misunderstands Efficiency Rebound Research" »
Because automobiles are bigger and more powerful than they were three decades ago, major innovations in fuel efficiency have only produced minor gains in gas mileage, another clear example of rebound effects at work.
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Updated 1/6/12
Automotive engines steadily improved in efficiency by roughly 60 percent from 1980 to 2006, according to a new study by MIT economist Christopher Knittel. That means we could already be driving cars that get an average of 37 miles per gallon (MPG), well above today's average of 27 MPG. The catch, points out Reason's Ronald Bailey: we'd have to be driving cars with the same average weight and power as the average car on the road in 1980.
Instead, consumers took the majority of the improvements in engine efficiency over the last three decades to enjoy larger and more powerful cars (e.g. increasing their use of energy services) rather than reduce energy use, according Knittel's paper, published in American Economic Review.
As Reason's Bailey notes, "This seems an example of the energy rebound effect in which increased energy efficiency encourages people to use even more energy; in this case to fuel bigger and peppier cars."
Indeed it does. (Click here for an introductory FAQ to rebound effects)
If vehicle weight and average power had held constant from 1980 to 2006, Knittel estimates that vehicles today would be roughly 60 percent more efficient than they were in the '80s. Instead, average fuel economy of new vehicles sold in the United States improved just 15 percent over this period.
The reason is clear: consumers chose to take these improvements in engine efficiency as a major increase in average vehicle weight, which rose 26 percent, and a doubling of average horsepower, which rose 106 percent from 1980 to 2006.
"Most of that technological progress has gone into [compensating for increased] weight and horsepower," notes Knittel.
Continue reading "MIT Study: Rebound Effects Erode Auto Efficiency Gains" »
Conservation Magazine spotlights the rebound effect
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Writing for Conservation Magazine, reporter John Carey spotlights an ongoing debate over "rebound effects" simmering amongst academic and energy policy making communities. "The Efficiency Catch-22" notes that as economies and consumers become more efficient, demand for the services we derive from energy rebounds, eroding some or even all of the initially expected energy reductions.
As Carey writes: Now, new studies .. are again suggesting that modern efforts to improve energy efficiency could lead to big rebound effects; they're touching a nerve and prompting debate in energy and climate circles. Governments and think tanks have launched studies of the paradox, and stories in the New Yorker and New York Times have even suggested that energy efficiency, far from being a savior, could actually be bad for the environment. "The stakes are actually pretty high," says Roland Geyer, professor of industrial ecology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and coauthor of a recent review of the rebound literature.
Dr. Geyer is right: the stakes are quite high.
As Breakthrough Institute documents in our comprehensive review of the academic literature on energy efficiency and rebound effects, "Energy Emergence" (February 2011), most climate mitigation strategies and national energy policies assume that significant gains can be made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and national energy imports at little to no cost or even positive economic gain, chiefly by pursuing "below-cost" energy efficiency measures -- improvements that more than pay for themselves through energy savings over time. The International Energy Agency, for example, counsels global policy makers that energy efficiency can accomplish more than half (58 percent) of all global greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed by 2050 in order to put the world on track to a stable climate (see image at right).
Yet rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward we take towards climate mitigation via below-cost efficiency measures, we take one or more steps backwards through rebound effects. And conventional climate mitigation scenarios, including the IEA's and IPCC's, ignore or incompletely and improperly consider rebound effects in their analysis.
If we follow such a course, and ignore rebound effects, the globe will be dangerously over-reliant on energy efficiency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Even if rebound effects erode just one-third to one-half of the initially expected savings, the globe could fall 20 to 30 percent short of needed emissions cuts, if the IEA's mitigation plan is followed. Further, such a shortfall means the time available to devise additional remedies is reduced, increasing the urgency of the clean energy supply-side challenge.
Continue reading "Does Efficiency Present a Catch-22?" »
A strong rebound effect actually enhances the economic case for cost-effective energy efficiency standards
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In an all-to-predictable swipe at new fuel economy standards currently being negotiated by the White House and the auto industry, the arch-conservative Heritage Foundation invokes rebound effects as the latest reason to oppose increased auto efficiency:
When it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, The Atlantic's Megan McArdle notes that fuel efficiency standards will reduce carbon dioxide emissions, "but not by as much as advertised, because more fuel efficient cars make driving cheaper, so people will do more of it. This 'rebound' effect robs about 25% of gains, and also means more congestion, and more wear-and-tear on roads." The rebound effect also takes away some of the estimated cost savings and oil reduction.
Let's ignore for a moment the rich irony inherent in the Heritage Foundation expressing any concern about the efficacy of auto efficiency standards in cutting carbon emissions...
Rather, let's focus on the economic implications of rebound effects, which Heritage gets exactly backwards here. If improved vehicle efficiency triggers a rebound in demand for the energy services derived from personal transportation, that rebound represents an unequivocal improvement in economic welfare at the individual level and a sign of improved productivity and growth at the economy-wide level. Last we checked, Heritage was all for economic growth and improved individual welfare.
Continue reading "Heritage Foundation Gets Rebound Effect Backwards in Fuel Economy Attack" »
In the pages of UNIDO's Making It magazine, Breakthrough's Jesse Jenkins and Harry Saunders explain the impact and implications of the energy demand "rebound effect" spurred on by energy efficiency.
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In the pages of United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)'s Making It quarterly magazine, Breakthrough Institute Energy and Climate Policy Director Jesse Jenkins and Senior Fellow Harry Saunders published an article explaining the impact and implications of the energy demand "rebound effect" spurred on by energy efficiency.
The article builds upon the Breakthrough Institute's "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena", a comprehensive literature review pointing to the expert consensus and evidence that below-cost energy efficiency measures drive a rebound in energy consumption that erodes much of expected energy savings.
Read the full article: "Hot topic: Does energy efficiency lead to increased energy consumption?," Making It June, 2011
In the article, Jenkins and Saunders argue:
Truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures lower the effective price of the services derived from fuel consumption - heating, cooling, transportation, industrial processes, etc. - leading consumers and industry alike to demand more of these services. There are other indirect and economy-wide effects as well, as consumers re-spend money saved through efficiency on other energy-consuming goods and services, industrial sectors adjust to changes in the relative prices of final and intermediate goods, and greater energy productivity causes the economy as a whole to grow. Collectively, these economic mechanisms drive a rebound in demand for energy services that can erode much - and in some cases all - of the expected reductions in total energy use, along with much-hoped-for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, rebound effects are often most pronounced in the productive sectors of the economy, including industry and agriculture, as well as throughout the world's emerging economies.
...
Conventional climate mitigation strategies count on energy efficiency to do a great deal of work. For example, the IEA in a global climate stabilization scenario published by the agency in December 2009, estimates that efficiency measures could account for roughly half of the emissions reductions needed. Yet, from a climate or global resource conservation perspective, rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward taken through greater efficiency, rebounds take us one (or more) steps backwards. This is particularly true throughout the developing world, and in the productive sectors of the global economy.
A clear understanding of rebound effects therefore demands a fundamental re-assessment of energy efficiency's role in global climate mitigation efforts.
A continued failure to accurately and rigorously account for rebound effects risks an over-reliance on the ability of efficiency to deliver lasting reductions in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. Without a greater emphasis on the other key climate mitigation lever at our disposal - the de-carbonization of global energy supplies through the deployment and improvement of low-carbon energy sources - the global community will fall dangerously short of climate mitigation goals.
At the same time, however, we can re-affirm the role of energy efficiency efforts in expanding human welfare and fueling global economic development. Unlocking the full potential of efficiency may very well mean the difference between a richer, more efficient world, and a poorer, less efficient world. The former is clearly the desirable case - even if the world uses more or less the same amount of energy in either scenario.
The pursuit of any and all cost-effective efficiency opportunities should thus continue as a key component of an efficient course for global development, even as we reconsider the degree to which these measures can contribute to climate mitigation efforts.
You can also find an introductory FAQ on the rebound effect here.
A large gulf stands between the work of serious energy analysts and a recent essay published by NRDC's analysts, which stubbornly assert that "rebounds at the economy-wide level are trivially small."
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By Harry Saunders and Jesse Jenkins
Update - 9/2/2011 - Please see corrigendum appended to this post
A recent article in Electricity Policy by Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) analysts (David Goldstein et al.) purports to offer a fresh look at the question of energy consumption rebound resulting from cost-effective efficiency improvements. But rather than advancing the ongoing discussion about rebound among serious energy analysts, NRDC attempts to turn back the clock, relying on outdated and recycled citations dating from as far back as the early 1990s and asserting that conclusions about rebound effects must be testable against "rigorously framed hypotheses" while failing to apply that standard to their own claims regarding the historic success of efficiency policies in reducing energy use.
In reviewing their article, it is difficult to escape the feeling that Goldstein and his colleagues simply ignore any recent work that is inconvenient to their premise, including a rich trove of literature and inquiry into rebound effects published in recent years. It is particularly revealing that the authors restrict their analysis to those sectors of the global energy economy where rebound effects appear to be least significant--end-use consumption in rich, developed economies. In so doing they ignore both the productive sectors of the economy responsible for two-thirds of the global energy use and the emerging economies driving the vast bulk of global energy demand growth--in short those sectors of the global energy economy in which the vast majority of current and future energy demand is concentrated and in which the rebound literature suggests rebound effects are likely to be greatest.
In fact, NRDC's contention that "rebounds at the economy-wide level are trivially small" is controverted by virtually every review of the evidence for energy efficiency rebound conducted in recent years. So while NRDC attempts to re-litigate a decades-old debate, for serious analysts and policymakers, particularly in Europe, this debate, about whether rebound exists and is non-trivial, is effectively over. The focus now is on developing a richer understanding of when and where such effects operate, at what scale, and, increasingly, a focus on what, if anything, can be done to mitigate such phenomena. The UK government, for example, now explicitly considers at least one rebound mechanism when planning efficiency policies. And the European Commission funded a large study in 2011 that begins from the consensus that rebound effects are real and significant, and explores what can done about it.
In the United States, the tone seems to be shifting and signs are appearing that energy researchers are beginning to realize they need to deal forthrightly with this issue. Many who before quite adamantly denied the rebound phenomenon now treat it more cautiously as the academic substantiveness of multiple recent studies becomes apparent. Small working groups of scholars are forming to address the gaps in our knowledge. The Center for Climate and Energy Decision Making at Carnegie Mellon University will soon host a gathering of scholars to define the research questions that call out for serious inquiry. And the latest Stanford Energy Modeling Forum study on energy efficiency (EMF, 2011), while it still overlooks much of the recent literature (perhaps because it was framed a few years ago) nonetheless acknowledges key rebound mechanisms.
The critical question really isn't whether or not rebound effects exist -- as basic economic theory dictates, they most certainly do -- but rather how large they may be in various contexts.
Truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures lower the effective price of the services derived from fuel consumption - heating, cooling, transportation, industrial processes, etc. We know that economic actors react in complex ways to changes in the relative and absolute prices of various goods and services, and in particular, that when prices fall, consumers and industry alike demand more of these services, all else being equal. Other indirect and economy-wide effects can result from efficiency improvements as well, as consumers re-spend money saved through efficiency on other energy-consuming goods and services, industrial sectors adjust to changes in the relative prices of final and intermediate goods, and greater energy productivity causes the economy as a whole to grow. Collectively, these various mechanisms are known as "rebound effects" as they drive a rebound in demand for energy services that significantly erodes reductions in total energy use otherwise expected from efficiency improvements, along with much-hoped-for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In rough terms, for every two steps forward we may take through efficiency, rebound effects take us one (or more) steps backwards.
(Read an introductory FAQ on rebound here)
Unfortunately, conventional forecasts of energy use and the reductions possible through efficiency measures routinely ignore many (if not all) of the various rebound mechanisms. To the extent rebound phenomena are non-trivial, the implication is that the traditional forecasts of global energy use on which so much of climate change policy is reliant may seriously understate the scale of the challenge by ignoring or improperly treating rebound, meaning we have less time than we think to devise climate solutions.
NRDC's entry into this high-stakes debate disappoints on the methodology side, as we discuss in detail below. But the article also reads like an effort to turn back the clock to a time five to ten years ago when many still dismissed the rebound phenomenon as irrelevant, the province of a few fringe theorists, perhaps. This finds its reflection in the outdated citations the analysts rely on, with the most frequently cited report dating from 2005 (IEA/Geller) and reliant in turn upon Greene (1992), itself a survey of even older literature.
The field has progressed substantially since then--especially in Europe.
Perhaps triggered by the exhaustive UK Energy Research Center study of rebound led by Steve Sorrell (2007, 2009), inquiry into rebound effects has since seen noteworthy advances overseas. Significant funding in Europe is now going to researchers examining the problem through multiple analytic methods, and the fruits of these labors are appearing monthly in the literature.
In a statement that NRDC's analysts clearly did not take to heart, Sorrell concluded his rigorous assessment of the literature in 2007 with this statement:
"It would be wrong to assume that, in the absence of evidence, rebound effects are so small that they can be disregarded. Under some circumstances ... economy-wide rebound effects may exceed 50% and could potentially increase energy consumption in the long-term. In other circumstances ... economy-wide rebound effects are likely to be smaller. But in no circumstances are they likely to be zero."
In 2011, one of your authors led another comprehensive survey of the field (Jenkins et al.), which concludes:
"Rebound effects are real and significant and combine to drive a total, economy-wide rebound in energy demand with the potential to erode much (and in some cases all) of the reductions in energy consumption expected to arise from below-cost efficiency improvements."
While both literature reviews put the state-of-the-art in the field at NRDC's fingertips, their analysts unfortunately opt to merely cite selectively from both works, while ignoring the broad consensus that has developed in the academic literature.
We suggest the NRDC would be better advised to instead climb on board and move without delay up this learning curve. The bright and committed staff and analysts at NRDC have much to contribute to the understanding - and management - of rebound effects.
But as it stands, there are several methodological difficulties with the current NRDC analysis. Two are central:
- First, the NRDC paper hangs on an effort to construct and examine "rigorously-testable hypotheses" of rebound, a method they fail to appropriately utilize, while eventually falling afoul of their own requirement for testability of hypotheses in their effort to prove the historic success of efficiency policies in reducing energy use.
- Second, the authors make the common error of focusing their arguments on the smallest part of the energy economy--end-use consumption in rich, developed economies. This means they ignore both the productive sector of the economy responsible for two-thirds of the global energy use and the emerging economies driving the vast bulk of global energy demand growth--and the different-in-kind rebound mechanics in play in both places. In such sectors, the shadow of Jevons still lurks (see Jenkins et al. 2011 for survey of key literature).
Other non-methodological difficulties arise in their portrayal of the positions of rebound analysts, possibly due to a failure to undertake the hard work of examining the rich and burgeoning recent literature. Whatever the cause, it leads them to falsely portray key elements of the debate, and to apparently lay claim to new insights that are in fact old ones.
Continue reading "Rebound and Rigor: NRDC's Entry into Rebound Effect Debate Stuck in the Past " »
China is on a roaring path towards single-handedly swamping any hopes of climate stability. The nation's current climate pledges appear lackadaisical rather than ambitious and just as likely to trigger significant rebounds in energy use than real CO2 reductions. The only way to avert potential climate catastrophe is to de-link economic growth from carbon emissions by fueling China -- and the world -- with clean, affordable, and massively scalable energy technologies. Our current menu of technological options is dangerously short, and there's no time to waste: we must make clean energy cheap, and fast.
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I've said it before and I'll say it again: when it comes to the global climate challenge, as goes China, so goes the world.
Driving that aphorism home, co2scorecard.org, a not-for-profit project that closely tracks global greenhouse gas emissions, now reports that China's CO2 emissions increased by 906 million tons in 2009 -- the second largest annual increase for any country in recorded history. China's soaring emissions were enough to completely offset the drop in emissions wrought by the economic havoc plaguing much of the Western world (see graphic below).
China's unprecedented surge in CO2
As Goes China, So Goes the World: Soaring CO2 emissions from energy use in China drive global greenhouse gas trends (click image to enlarge; source: co2scorecard.org)
Over the last decade, China's annual emissions of climate destabilizing CO2 jumped by 5 billion tons per year. According to Shakeb Afsah, President and CEO of co2scorecard.org, that's "the highest [increase in annual CO2 output] for a single country in recorded history, representing an average annual emissions increase of almost 12%--more than four times the rate observed [for China] the previous decade."
To put this unprecedented 5 billion ton increase in annual CO2 emissions in context, Mr Afsah and colleague Kendyl Salcito note that during the 14-year long post-war boom period of 1959-1973, during which U.S. CO2 emissions rose each year, America's annual output of CO2 jumped by only 2 billion tons.
Continue reading "Climate Challenge Hinges on Fueling China with Clean and Cheap Energy" »
This set of frequently asked questions accompanies a new Breakthrough Institute report, "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena." That report surveys the relevant academic literature and finds extensive evidence that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand 'rebound effects.'
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On February 17th, Breakthrough Institute released a new, comprehensive survey of the literature and evidence concerning the rebound effects triggered by many energy efficiency improvements.
"Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" explains why energy efficiency measures that truly 'pay for themselves' will lower the cost of energy services -- heating, transportation, industrial processes, etc. -- driving a rebound in energy demand that can erode a significant portion of the expected energy savings and climate benefits of these measures.
This new set of Frequently Asked Questions explains rebound effects, how they operate, what kinds of energy efficiency improvements trigger bigger or smaller rebounds, and why coming to terms with the full scale of rebound challenges the heart of many contemporary climate mitigation strategies.
You can download the full "Energy Emergence" report here, or download and view a Power Point briefing on the report here.
Click any question below to view the answer...
Q: What is a "rebound effect?"
A: Increasing the efficiency of an energy consumptive activity will lower the cost of the services derived from that activity - that is, it will change the price of the "energy services" derived from the fuels, such as lighting, transportation goods or services, heating or cooling, industrial processes, etc.
Economic actors respond to price changes in two general ways:
- Increasing the utilization of that energy service to increase outputs or incomes. For example, a low-income resident may now heat his or her home more often or heat more areas of the home after weatherizing their home, because it is now far more affordable to heat. (In economics speak, this involves 'elasticities of demand,' or the responsiveness of demand to changes in the price of goods and services)
- Re-arranging the factors of production or goods and services consumed to substitute now-cheaper energy services for other goods or services (maintaining the same level of output or income). For example, a more efficient heat plant may enable a chemicals plant or metals smelter to raise temperatures in industrial processes to extract high quality product from poorer quality inputs (substituting energy for materials) or to reduce process times (substituting energy for labor). (In economic terms, this involves 'substitution elasticities,' or the ability of firms or consumers to take advantage of lower prices to productively re-arrange the production inputs or consumer goods they utilize).
Both of these dynamics are "rebound effects," a term for any economic mechanism that leads to a rebound, or increase, in demand for energy following an improvement in energy efficiency that lowers the effective cost of that energy service.
There are other rebound effects as well (for a quick description of each, see the summary here). Our report, "Energy Emergence" surveys more than half a dozen distinct rebound mechanisms, some of which are fairly direct (like the two above), others that are more indirect (like the impact of money saved through efficiency measures as it is re-spent in the economy on other goods or services that in turn require energy to produce). Still more effects are only visible in the aggregate, at the macro-economic scale, as economies respond in a variety of ways to widespread improvements in energy efficiency.
Q: So do rebound effects wipe out all of the energy savings from efficiency improvements?
A: No, not always. Although in some cases, it is possible that efficiency improvements will "backfire," driving a rebound in energy that fully compensate for the initial energy savings, increasing energy demand overall. While backfire is by no means the norm, it is possible in some cases (we'll explore conditions that are likely to lead to backfire in a later question).
As "Energy Emergence" concludes, "Rebound effects are real and significant, and combine to drive total economy-wide rebound in energy demand with the potential to erode much (and in some cases all) of the reductions in energy consumption expected to arise from below-cost efficiency improvements."
Think of it this way: rebound effects mean that for every two steps forward we take in energy savings through efficiency, rebound effects take us one (and sometimes more) steps backwards. We may still move forward, but not as much as we initially expected.
Q: So what's the big deal? We still make progress right? Why do rebound effects matter?
A: Rebound matters because the magnitude of rebound effects determines how effective below-cost efficiency improvements are at contributing to lasting reductions in total energy use and therefore greenhouse gas emissions.
Energy efficiency has frequently been cited as the single greatest contributor to emissions reduction and climate mitigation strategies, by everyone from the International Energy Agency and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to consultants like Amory Lovins' Rocky Mountain Institute and McKinsey to efficiency advocates and environmental NGOs. The IEA counts on efficiency for roughly half of the emissions reductions needed in their "Blue Map" climate stabilization scenario (graphic below), for example, while President Obama told reporters in 2009 that with efficiency, "we can save as much as 30 percent of our current energy usage."

So we're counting on energy efficiency to do quite a bit of "climate mitigation work," so to speak.
The problem is that all of these estimates are based on an assumption: that energy efficiency reduces energy demand in a linear, direct, and one-for-one manner. An X% gain in efficiency leads to an equivalent X% reduction in total energy use.
But the economy is anything but direct, linear, and simple, especially when responding to changes in the relative price of goods and services. When a good or service or input to production gets cheaper, consumers and firms use more of it, find new cost-effective uses for it, re-invest any savings in other productive activities, and the economy overall gets more productive overall, driving economic growth and activity.
That's the rebound effect, and it means that we can't assume that improving energy efficiency by 20%, for example, will reduce energy demand by 20%.
If we don't accurately and rigorously account for rebound effects, we risk over-relying on energy efficiency to deliver lasting reductions in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, and we will fall dangerously short of climate mitigation goals.
Q: But I've always heard that rebound effects are really small. Amory Lovins has written that "we are observing only very small rebound effects (if any at all) in the United States," for example. He says that we don't drive our cars twice as much just because they are twice as efficient, for example. How big a deal is this?
A: Rebound effects differ in scale, depending on the type of energy efficiency improvements we're talking about, and where in the economy we look. In very few cases are rebound effects "very small" or insignificant.
Dozens of academic studies have examined the empirical evidence, conducted modeling inquiries, and otherwise tested the scale of rebound effects. While there is much more work to be done to determine the precise scale and impact of rebound effects in different circumstances, the conclusion is that rebound effects are significant and cannot be ignored in energy and climate analysis and policymaking. See the following three questions for summaries of the scale of rebound in different circumstances...
Q: So how large would rebound be if we improve end-use consumer energy services like personal transportation or home heating or appliances?
A: In rich, developed nations, if we improve the efficiency of end-use consumer energy services, like cars, home heating and cooling, or appliances, the literature indicates that direct rebound effects alone are typically on the scale of 10-30% of the initial energy savings. Additional indirect and macroeconomic effects may mean total rebound erodes roughly one quarter to one third of expected energy savings in these situations.
Rebound here is smallest in cases when demand for the energy service in question is already saturated (that is, we use as much of it as we would care to use), and highest in cases where the cost of the energy service is a key constraint on fulfilling demand for that service. For example, if a wealthy homeowner already reliably heats all the rooms in his or her house to 70 degrees, he/she wouldn't increase the thermostat to 77 degrees just because our heating system got 10% more efficient. But if a poorer household can't afford to turn the thermostat up, or only heats one room of the house with a small space heater, because the house is too drafty, then if the house gets weatherized and more efficient, that household is likely to use more energy to heat their home. In general, end-use consumer efficiency improvements in rich, developed economies will still lead to a net savings in energy, although rebound effects shouldn't be ignored even here.
Q: Should we expect rebounds to be the same in rich and poor nations?
A: No, rebound effects are almost certainly larger in poorer, developing nations.
For efficiency in end-use consumer energy services in developing nations, direct rebound effects alone are likely to be much higher than in richer nations, on the order of 40-80%. Rebound is higher here because demand for energy services is far from saturated, demand is far more elastic (responsive to changes in price), and the cost of energy services is often a key constraint on the enjoyment of energy services. This is important, because growing demand in developing nations is the principal driver of energy demand growth worldwide.
We should be very careful in generalizing our experiences or intuitions about rebound effects in rich, developed nations to the larger bulk of the global population living in developing economies. As Lee Schipper and Michael Grubb wrote in 2000:
"[I]n low-income economies, energy and energy costs are often a constraint on economic activity. ... In short, the shadow of Jevons lurks [in developing nations] for precisely the same reason that more efficient use of coal [in Jevons' Britain] did not save coal: the combined effects of different rebounds are very important when energy availability, energy efficiency, and energy costs are a significant constraint to activity and therefore energy use." Since expanding the supply of energy services is a key constraint on economic activity in developing nations, the macro-economic impact of efficiency improvements in developing economies is also likely to be more significant, helping developing economies grow faster (and thus consume more energy).
Q: What about industrial efficiency improvements? Does making a business or a factory more efficient trigger energy demand rebound?
A: While more study of rebound effects for efficiency improvements at producing firms (e.g. industry and commerce) is needed, the literature to date indicates that direct rebound effects may be on the order of 20-70% for these sectors, with additional rebound due to indirect and macroeconomic effects.
Rebound effects in firms depend principally on the ability of firms to rearrange their factors of production (labor, capital, energy, and various materials) to better take advantage of now-cheaper energy services. This is especially true for new productive capacity. If long-term substitution is high, rebound effects can be substantial. In addition, output effects contribute to rebound for energy intensive firms with a high elasticity of demand for their products (that is, where consumers are very responsive to changes in the price of their products and demand more product as the price falls).
Improvements in energy productivity at firms can also contribute to greater economic activity and growth, driving up energy demand overall. In general, rebound effects are higher for efficiency in productive sectors of the economy than for end-use consumer efficiency. This is notable, because two-thirds of the energy consumed in the U.S. is consumed in the productive sectors of the economy and "embedded" in the non-energy goods and services purchased by consumers.
Q: What happens if we pursue efficiency improvements across an entire sector or economy? If we make the entire U.S. economy more efficient, for example, should we still expect rebound effects?
A: Yes. At the economy-wide, macro-economic scale, the aggregate impacts of widespread energy efficiency improvements can lead to substantial rebound effects, as producers and consumers respond in turn to various cascading changes in the price of goods and services, the pace of economic growth quickens, and market prices for fuels may fall, driving a further rebound due to market price effects. Since these economic responses are complex and varied, economic modeling is most often used to estimate the scale of macroeconomic rebound due to aggregate efficiency improvements.
A number of 'Computable General Equilibrium' models (see page 34 of the study) generally show rebound at the scale of a national economy of 30-50% or greater, with a surprising number predicting rebound greater than 100% (aka 'backfire'). These studies look at national economies and thus ignore global, macro-economic impacts beyond national boarders, which can add additional rebound in energy consumption.
'Integrative modeling,' a more detailed approach utilized by energy analysts at Cambridge, found that if the world adopted all of the "no regrets" energy efficiency policies suggested by the International Energy Agency, then rebounds effects would erode more than half of expected savings (52%) in the long-term. There are also several reasons to think this is may be a conservative estimate (see pages 39-40 of the study).
At the macro-economic, global scale most relevant to climate change mitigation efforts, then, rebound effects can be substantial, and erode much (if not all) of the expected energy savings and climate benefits.
Q: When is backfire likely to occur? Are there times when rebound wipes out ALL of the savings from energy efficiency?
A: Rebound is likely to be particularly acute and is most likely to trigger backfire (rebound >100% of initially expected energy savings) in the following cases:
- If the supply of energy services is a key constraint on economic activity and growth (as it is in much of the developing world), then improvements in energy efficiency are likely to trigger acute rebound or even backfire. In a world where roughly 1.6 billion people lack access to electricity and 2.5 billion rely primarily on primitive biomass (e.g., wood and dung) for cooking and heating, huge pent-up demand for energy services persists and the availability of energy services will be a major determinant of future rates of economic growth and progress. This in turn indicates potential for very large rebounds for efficiency improvements in developing nations.
- When more efficient (and thus lower cost) energy services open up new markets or enable widespread new energy-using applications, products, or even entire new industries to emerge. We dub this dynamic a 'frontier effect' in our report, because in these cases, the 'production-possibility frontier' for an energy-using technology expands significantly, opening up unforeseen opportunities for substitution and potentially significant impacts on economic activity and the composition of the economy. In such cases, backfire is the most likely outcome.
Backfire due to this 'frontier effect' dynamic is most likely to arise for 'general-purpose technologies' that have a wide scope for improvement and elaboration, have potential for use in a wide variety of products and processes, and have strong complementarities with existing or potential new technologies. Examples of 'general-purpose technologies' could include steam engines, electric motors, lighting, gas turbines, semiconductors and computing technologies, lasers, robotics, radio transmitters, and perhaps many others. Backfire is most likely to result after energy efficiency improvements in these general-purpose technologies. (See p. 47-8 of the report.)
These emergent 'frontier effect' dynamics may prove particularly challenging for energy analysts to forecast or account for in modeling efforts, as they necessarily involve unforeseen and unpredictable applications of new and improved technologies. This means that forecasts of rebound can easily underestimate eventual rebound due to frontier effects triggered by sustained efficiency gains.
- When energy efficiency improvements not only improve the productivity of energy, but also result in simultaneous improvements in other factors of production, such as labor or capital (a 'multi-factor productivity improvement'), an outsized impact on economic output and significant rebound in energy demand can arise.
Very large rebound or backfire is likely the norm in cases of 'win-win' efficiency opportunities, where energy-saving technical changes simultaneously improve the productivity of other factors of production, multiplying the impacts on output, economic growth and energy demand.
For example, in a 2005 paper, efficiency consultant Amory Lovins writes:
"Improved energy efficiency, especially end-use efficiency, often delivers better services. Efficient houses are more comfortable; efficient lighting systems can look better and help you see better; efficiency motors can be more quiet, reliable, and controllable; efficient refrigerators can keep food fresher for longer; efficient cleanrooms can improve the yield, flexibility, throughput, and setup time of microchip fabrication plants; ... retail sales pressure can rise 40% in well-daylit stores ... Such side- benefits can be one or even two orders of magnitude more valuable than the energy directly saved. ...[I]n efficient buildings, ... labor productivity typically rises by about 6-16%. Since office workers in industrialized countries cost ~100x more than office energy, a 1% increase in labor productivity has the same bottom-line effect as eliminating the energy bill - and the actual gain in labor productivity is ~6-16x bigger than that." While the multi-factor productivity improvements Lovins describes greatly improve the economic case for energy efficiency upgrades, they simultaneously raise the specter of significantly greater rebound in energy demand than if the improvement in energy productivity were considered alone (as is common in the inquiries discussed in prior sections). If the economic impact of labor productivity improvements from efficient buildings is several orders of magnitude greater than the simultaneous savings in energy consumption, for example, then the rebound due to economic growth/output effects alone should also be several orders of magnitude greater than would be predicted if the energy savings were considered alone.
Q: Are you saying energy efficiency is a waste of time then? Are you arguing against pursuing efficiency?
A: Most certainly not! Truly cost-effective energy efficiency improvements make great economic sense and improved energy efficiency may be a key determinant of future economic welfare. In this sense, it may also contribute indirectly to climate mitigation and decarbonization objectives (see "Discussion and Implications" section of our report).
As Skip Laitner of the American Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy writes, "our lagging efforts on efficiency may actually constrain our larger economic productivity."
As we note in our report, this is often the case, particularly in the developing world. Pursuing cost effective energy efficiency opportunities makes great sense then from an economic development and human welfare perspective. At the same time, however, this is precisely why energy efficiency can trigger significant rebound effects that reduce the ability of efficiency to drive down total greenhouse gas emissions, even as efficiency contributes significantly to greater economic growth.
In short, unlocking the full potential of efficiency may mean the difference between a richer, more efficient world, and a poorer, less efficient world. The former is clearly the desirable case, and the one we should all strive for! But in either case, the world will use more or less the same amount of energy. In some parts of the economy, efficiency may reduce overall energy use, while in others it may increase it. The net effect, after accounting for efficiency's role in unlocking economic growth (among other rebound effects) is far from a linear and direct reduction in energy use.
We therefore argue that we should continue to pursue any cost-effective efficiency opportunities on economic grounds, even as we reconsider the degree to which these measures will contribute to climate mitigation efforts.
As we state in the report:
"In any case, truly cost-effective energy efficiency measures should be vigorously pursued, as they will lead to an improvement in general welfare (at least narrowly construed in economic terms). However, from a climate mitigation perspective, we must be keenly aware of the precise, macroeconomic impacts of energy efficiency improvements, since only a reduction in total aggregate energy consumption will directly contribute to emissions reduction objectives. This in turn requires an understanding and analysis of the non-linear combination of impacts on economic activity, demand for energy as a factor of production, and other macroeconomic factors that are together summed up in the term 'rebound effect.'"
Q: Are you saying that rebound effects are the reason energy use has continued to rise? Isn't energy use just growing because the economy is growing and richer people are using more energy?
A: Rebound effects are part of the reason that energy use is still growing, even as the economy gets more and more efficient. True, economic growth drives up energy use, even as we get more efficient. But those two terms - economic growth, and energy efficiency - are not unrelated, and rebound effects describe the relationship between the two.
Part of the reason the economy continues to grow is because below-cost energy efficiency improvements grow the supply of energy services and increase the productivity of the economy - we get more economic activity and income and welfare out of the same amount of energy - and productivity improvements are a key driver of economic growth.
Some economists argue that the supply of energy services is a key enabling force in economic growth: think about the impact of electric motors, industrial lasers, computing, automation, and all of the other ways in which we use energy - often quite efficiently - to greatly improve the productivity of our economy. Think about how important energy services - lighting, efficient cooking stoves, electricity - are to development outcomes in the emerging economies of the world. Efficiently expanding the supply of energy services may thus be one of the principal factors determining the rate of economic growth in rich and poor nations alike (see the previous question for more).
That said, there are definitely other factors driving economic growth, including improvements in the productivity of other inputs to the economy, such as labor, capital, and other materials. Rebound effects and energy productivity improvements aren't the only driver of economy growth by any means.
Q: But we aren't capturing all the efficiency opportunities out there. If we work harder at efficiency, can't we out pace the rate of economic growth and finally decouple the economy from consuming ever more energy?
A: Overall, the global economy has been growing at the rate of roughly 3% per year. Historically, we've only seen a roughly 1-1.5% improvement in energy use per unit of economic output (energy intensity or productivity) each year.
For energy efficiency gains to outstrip the increase in energy demand driven by the growing economy, the economy must improve energy intensity/productivity by at least 3% per year, roughly double or triple the historic rate of improvement.
So economic growth continues to out-pace energy efficiency improvements, and energy use continues to grow overall.
Efficiency advocates argue that if we work harder at capturing energy efficiency opportunities, we can more than double or triple this rate of efficiency improvement and bend global energy use downwards.
That's a big task already, but at least two factors make this challenge even harder:
- First, a large portion of changes in energy intensity over time can be attributed to structural changes in the economy (Baksi and Green 2007), as economies shift from agricultural to industrial to services-oriented over time. These aren't the technical improvements in transportation, lighting, buildings, or industrial efficiency that energy efficiency policies are concerned with, and these trends are hard to accelerate or effect through policy. They may not continue indefinitely either, so there are limits to gains here.
If, for example, one-half or two-thirds of the historic rate in energy intensity improvements are due to sectoral transitions and structural changes in the economy, then efforts to increase the rate of technical efficiency improvement must work two or three times harder to succeed. Instead of a more than doubling or tripling of our efforts, we must achieve a more than four to nine-fold increase in technical efficiency improvements. - Second, that estimate does not account for rebound effects. Rebound makes the goal even more challenging, as it means efficiency feeds back into energy consumption and economic growth increasing both and making the horizon we're reaching towards recede even further. For every two steps forward we take with below-cost energy efficiency, rebound effects take us roughly one (or more) steps backwards.
For these reasons, we think it is prudent to revisit the ability of below-cost energy efficiency to decouple the economy from growing energy use and drive lasting reductions in climate-destabilizing greenhouse gases. While we should continue to pursue cost-effective energy efficiency measures improvements wherever they may be found, as we write in the report (p. 52):
"Efforts to reliably reduce greenhouse gas emissions or dependence on depleting fossil fuels would be prudent to avoid the risk of overreliance on energy efficiency measures. Such efforts should therefore focus primarily on shifting the means of energy production (rather than end use), relying on zero-carbon and renewable energy sources to diversify and decarbonize the global energy supply system."
Q: Are rebound effects peculiar to energy? Does the same thing happen for labor or other materials
A: While the term 'rebound effect' is generally used by energy economists to talk about rebounds after energy efficiency, the basic economic mechanisms - elasticity of demand and substitution, re-spending effects, and the contribution of productivity to economic growth - are well-understood economic phenomena relevant to improvements in the price or productivity of any factor of production, be it capital, materials, or labor.
Let's consider labor, for example. Economists would never assume that a 20% improvement in labor productivity - aka a "labor efficiency" improvement - would reduce overall demand for labor in the economy by 20%.
Everyone knows that improving labor productivity drives economic growth, creates new profitable ways to utilize labor, and overall generally increases employment at the macroeconomic scope, not decreases it.
Even at the scope of the individual factory or assembly line, improving labor productivity may mean the plant can get by with fewer laborers on the shop floor, but even there, the net effects on demand for labor are far from linear and direct. Higher labor productivity lowers product costs and increase demand for those products and opens up new markets that weren't profitable before. It frees up money to re-invest in other areas of production, and it creates new jobs in other areas of business. Even at the firm level, a 20% improvement in labor productivity won't mean 20% of the company's staff is laid off.
Yet this is precisely the simplified, linear assumption that is routinely made in energy and climate forecasting and scenario planning. A 20% improvement in energy efficiency = a direct, 20% net reduction in energy demand, relative to business as usual.
"Rebound effects" are what energy economists call the same, common sense story we just went over for labor, when we're talking about energy productivity or efficiency rather than labor productivity.
The reality is that energy isn't different from labor, or materials, or capital, and a whole field of academic work has gone on - largely out of notice of mainstream energy analysis and policy making - to explore and illustrate how energy efficiency leads to a series of complex, non-linear response throughout the economy that drive a rebound in demand for energy services and thus a rebound in consumption of energy itself. Our "Energy Emergence" report surveys this evidence and presents key implications for climate mitigation efforts.
Q: Are "Rebound Effects" the same as the "Jevon's Paradox"?
A: More or less, yes. This basic but somewhat paradoxical dynamic - that energy efficiency lowers the price of energy services, leading to a rebound in consumption of those services - was first thoroughly discussed by British Economist William Stanley Jevons in an 1865 book, The Coal Question. He famously wrote, "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth."
Some people define this so-called "Jevons Paradox" more strictly, saying that the Paradox refers only to cases when the rebound effects triggered by efficiency measures drives more demand for energy than was originally saved by the efficiency improvements. That's a scenario known in the rebound literature as "backfire," a special kind of severe rebound effect that is greater than 100% of the initially expected energy savings. Backfire means improving energy efficiency actually increases energy demand overall, relative to what it would have been if the efficiency measures hadn't been pursued at all. This is precisely what Jevons observed when he noted that the much more efficient steam engine developed by James Watt led to a huge increase in coal consumption during the 19th century, rather than the conservation of Britain's dwindling coal resources.
However, the generalized dynamic Jevons observed: that efficiency lowers the cost of energy services, driving a rebound in demand for those services, not a direct linear reduction in demand or conservation of fuels, is equivalent to what energy economists now call "rebound effects."
Q: Do all energy efficiency improvements trigger rebound effects?
A: No, not all energy efficiency measures trigger rebound effects. Rebound effects are concerned with the response to below-cost efficiency improvements. That's the "low-hanging fruit" we always hear about, the efficiency measures that pay back more in avoided energy use than they cost to install. These are also the ones "below zero" on the often-cited McKinsey and Co. greenhouse gas abatement cost curve seen below. Below-cost efficiency measures always reduce the implicit price of energy services - the useful work provided by energy consumption, be it heating a home, transporting people or goods some distance, powering a production facility, or lighting a work space - and thus always trigger a rebound in demand for those services (see the first question in this series above). It's not a question of whether efficiency measures that truly "pay for themselves" will trigger rebound - they will - the question is how large that rebound will be?
Not all energy efficiency measures are below cost though (the graphic above has arrows pointing to a couple of 'above-cost' efficiency measures, according to McKinsey: plug-in hybrid electric cars, and efficient building design for new buildings). While they incur an economic cost, these efficiency measures should not trigger rebound effects and may still prove effective at reducing energy demand. As we wrote in the report (p. 52):
There is no shortage of opportunities to improve energy efficiency that are not cost-neutral or below-cost. While these measures come with a price tag, in many cases the costs are reasonable and such efforts may be well justified given the long-term threat, economic and otherwise, that global climate change represents.
Q: If we increase the price of fuels, say through a carbon tax or an energy tax, can we mitigate or avoid rebound effects?
A: Technically, yes. Price-induced efficiency improvements, whether in response to exogenous energy price increases (changes not caused by policy that is) or successful policy efforts to price carbon emissions or impose energy taxes, should not be expected to result in significant rebound. However, as we write in the report (p. 53), "to fully avoid rebound effects, energy price increases must be sufficient to keep the final price of energy services constant despite improvements in energy efficiency, eliminating any net productivity gains from the efficiency measures." That is, in rough terms, if energy efficiency drives down the price of energy services by 30% or 50%, then energy prices would have to increase through carbon taxes or fees by an equivalent 30% or 50%.
Achievement of deep reductions in energy demand and associated carbon emissions through price induced efficiency will therefore require substantial and rising energy prices over time and sustained over the multi-decadal periods relevant to climate policy, such that rising energy prices keep pace with the improvements in energy productivity.
Furthermore, if revenues collected through carbon pricing, energy taxes, or other efforts to raise energy prices are reinvested into economically productive ends, macroeconomic rebound effects may result, so the precise use of revenues will determine the efficacy of these policies in curbing rebound.
As we conclude in the report: "Thus, carbon pricing policies (e.g., carbon taxes or cap and trade systems) and energy taxes offer potential tools to mitigate some or all of the energy demand rebound resulting from efficiency improvement - although implementing such policies faces practical challenges and will invariably encounter the political difficulties inherent to policy efforts that seek to impose energy price increases that will result in loss of economic welfare (ignoring potential benefits of avoided economic externalities). Q: I read that your study had been "debunked" by Jonathan Koomey, an energy expert at Stanford University. What do you say to that?
A: Dr. Koomey has done no such thing, as he clarifies in a post at his own blog here. Koomey writes, "It will take time to review the technical questions in the detail this issue deserves, so I'll hold off on stating any conclusions until that work is done."
Joseph Romm of Climate Progress has misrepresented Koomey's work, claiming that "Some of the nation's top energy experts have debunked" our report, linking to a memo from Koomey as his sole evidence. There has been no "debunking" of the the Breakthrough Institute report surveying that literature nor even a serious attempt to debunk it.
A more up to date and unedited compilation of the key emails in that dialog can be read here, if the reader cares to delve deeply into this discussion and see for themselves. Note that the discussion is ongoing.
Q: I read a blog post by staff from the Natural Resources Defense Council who said that your report "blames a host of evils on efficiency, but fails to back up their accusations with facts." Is that true?
No. Far from blaming below-cost efficiency for "evils" we praise it as good for economic growth and welfare. However, we do point out that it can increase energy consumption, and that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions cannot rely, as many leading analysts to, on simplistic claims that energy efficiency results in direct energy consumption declines.
Steven Sorrell of the University of Sussex in England headed up a similarly comprehensive review of the evidence for rebound effects published by the UK Energy Research Center in 2007 and originally commissioned by the UK government. In reply to NRDC's David Goldstein and Ralph Cavanagh, he wrote: "[T]he claim that the Breakthrough Institute "fails to back up its accusations with facts" is plain wrong. Their report is based upon a large volume of empirical evidence in the academic literature. I reviewed this a few years ago - [link] - and the Breakthrough report brings this up to date." As Mr. Sorrell cautious, "[T]his topic [rebound effects] needs intelligent and careful research to help us understand it better, to improve the quantitative estimates, to reduce the uncertainties and to figure out what we can do in response. Simply dismissing it out of hand," as Goldstein and Cavanagh have tried to do, "will get us nowhere."
Do you have your own questions that aren't answered here? Please leave your question in the comments and we'll do our best to answer.
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Today's E&E News covered the release of the Breakthrough Institute's most recent report, "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena", pointing to the report's conclusion that "increasing the efficiency of our power systems and gadgets will not necessarily yield great reductions in energy use and could lead to using even more juice". The article is excerpted below (subscription required).
In a new review of energy efficiency literature, researchers at the Oakland, Calif.-based think tank found that a "rebound effect" means that implementing low-cost efficiency improvements can increase overall energy consumption and can even lead to a higher net energy use in what they describe as a "backfire effect."
"The implications are serious for climate and energy policy," wrote Michael Shellenberger, the institute's president, in a description of the study. "Energy efficiency measures that pay for themselves are good for the economy but are not guaranteed to reduce energy consumption or emissions, and may in fact increase them."
The study's conclusion is not that policymakers should steer clear of efficiency improvements, which the institute's researchers say are good for economic growth, but that such improvements should not be counted on to reduce energy use or associated emissions.
The study points to several mechanisms that contribute to the rebound effect. More efficient use of energy leads to higher production, with that increased economic output tied to higher energy use overall. Efficiency also leads to the substitution of energy inputs for others like labor and capital with a resulting increase in energy use.
Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a simple and direct way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions.
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Breakthrough Institute founders Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger issued the following statement along with the release of a new Breakthrough report, "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena."
Today Breakthrough Institute releases a new report finding extensive evidence that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand rebound, and that in some cases the rebound exceeds the savings, resulting in increased energy consumption from efficiency, known as backfire.
Leading government and international agencies, including the International Energy Agency, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate, and private consultancies such as McKinsey, have ignored or dismissed the strong evidence for rebound and even backfire in the peer-reviewed academic literature, resulting in climate mitigation scenarios that conclude that large emissions reductions can be achieved through greater efficiency. These agencies must, in future studies, take the evidence into account when constructing mitigation scenarios or risk a dangerous over-reliance on energy efficiency in climate mitigation strategies.
Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a simple and direct way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions.
Rebound and backfire could be mitigated through raising the price of energy. However, given the tight relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, climate mitigation must focus on cutting the relationship between energy consumption and emissions, which means moving to low-cost, zero-carbon energy sources.
"Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" finds extensive evidence and a strong expert consensus that a large amount of the energy savings from below-cost energy efficiency are eroded by demand 'rebound effects,' and that in some cases the rebound exceeds the savings, resulting in increased energy consumption from efficiency, known as backfire. The report contains a comprehensive review of the expert literature.
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There is a large expert consensus and strong evidence that below-cost energy efficiency measures drive a rebound in energy consumption that erodes much and in some cases all of the expected energy savings, concludes a new report by the Breakthrough Institute. "Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" covers over 96 published journal articles and is one of the largest reviews of the peer-reviewed journal literature to date.
Readers in a hurry can download Breakthrough's PowerPoint demonstration here or download the full paper here. An introductory FAQ can be found here, and is a good starting point for readers interested in rebound effects.
In a statement accompanying the report, Breakthrough Institute founders Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger wrote, "Below-cost energy efficiency is critical for economic growth and should thus be aggressively pursued by governments and firms. However, it should no longer be considered a direct and easy way to reduce energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions." The lead author of the new report is Jesse Jenkins, Breakthrough's Director of Energy and Climate Policy; Nordhaus and Shellenberger are co-authors.
The findings of the new report are significant because governments have in recent years relied heavily on energy efficiency measures as a means to cut greenhouse gases. "I think we have to have a strong push toward energy efficiency," said President Obama recently. "We know that's the low-hanging fruit, we can save as much as 30 percent of our current energy usage without changing our quality of life." While there is robust evidence for rebound in academic peer-reviewed journals, it has largely been ignored by major analyses, including the widely cited 2009 McKinsey and Co. study on the cost of reducing greenhouse gases.
Continue reading ""Energy Emergence: Rebound and Backfire as Emergent Phenomena" - Report Overview" »
Starting in the 1970s green groups helped kill new nuclear plants by claiming greater energy efficiency would slash energy consumption. It didn't. Energy demand rose 40 percent more than Amory Lovins predicted. The result? A coal-plant building boom. Time to rethink the role of energy efficiency.
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By Michael Shellenberger, Ted Nordhaus, and Jesse Jenkins
If there's one thing everyone knows for certain, it's that energy efficiency reduces energy consumption. President Obama, Steven Chu, Fortune 500 chieftains, Silicon Valley VCs, the U.N. and McKinsey all say it.
Why, then, does ever-greater efficiency go hand-in-hand with ever-greater energy consumption? In this week's New Yorker, journalist David Owen explains this apparent paradox. The essay (excerpted below) is as fascinating as anything written by Malcolm Gladwell. And the implications for energy and climate policy are of great significance.
Continue reading "The Efficiency Illusion" »
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Turns out that decades of energy efficient lightbulbs and Energy Star appliances haven't led to reductions in energy consumption in the average household, but they have given the average American relatively more disposable income to devote to new (energy-guzzling) gadgetry.
As David Fahrenthold reports in the Washington Post:
The amount of energy that the average American requires at home has changed little since the early 1970s -- despite advances in technology that have made many home appliances far more energy efficient...
But on a per-capita basis, Americans still require about 70 million British thermal units a year to heat, cool and power their homes, just as they did in 1971...
A key reason, experts say, is that American homes are getting bigger, which means more space to heat and cool. And consumers are buying more and more power-sucking gadgets -- meaning that kilowatts saved by dishwashers and refrigerators are often used up by flat-screen televisions, computers and digital video recorders.
These trends "have balanced each other out. It's been a wash, basically," said Lowell Ungar of the nonprofit Alliance to Save Energy.
Continue reading "In 40 Years of Energy Efficiency Improvements, No Change in Household Energy Consumption" »
Growing empirical evidence that energy efficient technologies may drive greater energy consumption, not less, demands a new look at the role of energy efficiency in efforts to mitigate climate change.
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One of the most curious facts about energy is that economies continue to use more of it even as they use it more efficiently. This strikes us as strange because it has become an article of faith that making cars, buildings, and factories more energy efficient is the key to cheaply and quickly reducing energy consumption, and thus pollution.
But energy experts have never seen this as particularly mysterious. As energy historian Vaclav Smil notes, "Historical evidence shows unequivocally that secular advances in energy efficiency have not led to any declines of aggregate energy consumption." A group of economists beginning in the 1980s went further, suggesting that increasing the productivity of energy would increase economic growth and energy consumption. Efficiency advocates dismiss the evidence of rebound in energy use pointing to direct behavioral changes at the household or business level that are easiest to measure. But the most significant energy rebounds are indirect -- in the production of energy, raw materials, and consumer goods -- not in the "end use" of consumer products.
Below, a leading energy economist, Harry Saunders, explains why energy efficiency does not decrease energy consumption in the way we conventionally understand it. In the process, Saunders clarifies the controversy over his recent co-authored study for the Journal of Physics, which reviews 300 years of lighting history to predict the impact of new solid-state lighting technologies (e.g. LEDs). Against the widespread belief that new lighting technology will reduce energy consumption, Saunders and his colleagues found that they will likely increase it -- greatly expanding the global use of lighting in the process, especially in developing countries. Saunders clarifies some important questions, and explains the basics of "the rebound effect."
With the new study, rebound has firmly moved from the theoretical to the empirical, and the implications of it must now be dealt with by all of us who were counting on efficiency to be an easy way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
-Michael Shellenberger, President, Breakthrough Institute
Why Energy Efficiency May Not Decrease Energy Consumption
By Harry Saunders
I recently co-authored an article for the Journal of Physics ("Solid-state lighting: an energy-economics perspective" by Jeff Tsao, Harry Saunders, Randy Creighton, Mike Coltrin, Jerry Simmon, August 19, 2010) analyzing the increase in energy consumption that will likely result from new (and more efficient) solid-state lighting (SSL) technologies. The article triggered a round of commentaries and responses that have confused the debate over energy efficiency. What follows is my attempt to clarify the issue, and does not necessarily represent the views of my co-authors.
Continue reading "Why Energy Efficiency May Not Decrease Energy Consumption" »
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