Shared Data, Independent Review

The Breakthrough Institute is currently engaging extensively as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) implements Executive Order 14300 and advances a series of interrelated reforms affecting new reactor licensing. One of those reforms would create a pathway for applicants to reference information from reactor designs previously authorized by the Department of Energy (DOE) or Department of War (DOW). BTI supports improved coordination among federal agencies and better use of relevant testing, analysis, operating experience, and technical information generated through DOE- and DOW-authorized activities. But that coordination must preserve the NRC’s independent licensing role and avoid turning prior federal authorization into a substitute for NRC safety findings.

BTI’s comment on the proposed rule argues that the NRC has not clearly shown why this pathway needs to be codified in regulation rather than addressed through guidance, since existing NRC processes already allow applicants to submit relevant data, testing, analyses, and operating experience from DOE/DOW-authorized activities. The proposed rule is therefore best understood as a narrow evidentiary clarification, not a new expedited approval track or a transfer of licensing authority. If the NRC proceeds with a final rule, it should explain the concrete regulatory need for codification and make clear that DOE- or DOW-derived information receives no presumption of sufficiency, evidentiary preference, or regulatory credit based solely on its source.

BTI’s comment on the draft interim staff guidance focuses on how the NRC should implement the proposed rule without creating confusion or legal vulnerability. The guidance should state clearly that DOE/DOW authorization decisions have no direct regulatory effect in NRC licensing. NRC should define what it means to “leverage” DOE/DOW-generated information, remove ambiguous phrases such as “to the maximum extent practical,” and explain how staff may adjust the focus and depth of review without lowering the applicable safety standard. BTI also urges the NRC to coordinate implementation across Parts 50, 52, 53, and any future Part 57 pathway, so applicants, staff, and stakeholders have consistent expectations across licensing frameworks.

As the NRC is simultaneously revising multiple licensing frameworks, including Parts 50, 52, 53, and 57, if DOE/DOW-derived information is treated differently across those pathways, the result could be overlapping but inconsistent implementation standards that reduce predictability rather than improve it. BTI recommends that the NRC coordinate these reforms and apply consistent principles across licensing frameworks: use relevant technical information where it is transferable and well supported, and preserve independent NRC review.

A durable licensing system for advanced reactors should make better use of federal testing and demonstration programs without weakening the legal and technical basis for NRC licensing decisions. Properly implemented, DOE/DOW experience can help reduce duplication and improve review focus. Poorly implemented, it could create uncertainty, inflate expectations, and undermine confidence in the NRC’s independent safety role.