Abundant Fuel for Abundant Reactors

Without fuel loaded into their cores, nuclear reactors cannot run. Yet as the United States and governments around the world seek to expand nuclear generation, the global nuclear fuel supply chain has descended into crisis. Except for the Russian and Chinese uranium industries, global mining and uranium enrichment industrial capacity has atrophied over recent decades. Today, the global nuclear fleet relies far too heavily on processed uranium from Russia in particular. Without current Russian enrichment capacity, there would not be enough enriched uranium feedstock to supply already operational nuclear power plants in Europe and North America, let alone support global growth of the sector.

President Trump’s executive orders of May 23, 2025, promise to increase both the demand and the supply of reactor fuel, but the total effects and the timing of these efforts are not clear. Fundamentally, any large-scale buildout of new U.S. nuclear projects will fail unless an adequate fuel supply chain is in place. The United States also has a national interest in supporting nuclear energy development in partner countries and combating dependence on Russia and China for uranium or uranium enrichment.

Our analysis found that the U.S. faces a dramatic shortage in enrichment capacity, with current capacity only sufficient to cover 10% to 25% of projected annual needs in 2050 (Figure ES-1). The production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) to support the deployment and operation of advanced nuclear reactors could account for the majority of these future enrichment requirements. The U.S. doesn’t need to meet all uranium enrichment needs with domestic production and can cooperate with allies to secure supply, but should also seek to minimize general geopolitical risk and ensure energy security. In light of these needs, U.S. policymakers must take urgent and aggressive steps to foster a robust commercial market for enrichment and fuel fabrication, particularly for HALEU.

For a global nuclear industry to prosper without fully relying on China and Russia will also require a significant increase in uranium services. Even assuming a world nuclear market that continues to remain weighted heavily toward conventional light-water reactors and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, enrichment needs may more than double while uranium mining may see a nearly fourfold increase.

While policymakers and nuclear advocates want increased investment in uranium services to replace Russian supply, such discussions require quantitative understanding of the magnitude of nuclear fuel supply chain investments required to meet anticipated demand. Our findings highlight the vast gap between commercializing a limited domestic enrichment industry and achieving the scale necessary to support a significant U.S. program of nuclear project construction. To meet anticipated demands, the federal government must provide assurance of both future supply of and demand for nuclear fuel, mobilizing policy efforts to secure access to total enrichment capacity around five to ten times larger than current U.S. capacity. Maximization of energy security will require developing a significant share of this added enrichment capacity in the United States. Successful development of a domestic fuel supply chain may in turn position the U.S. advantageously to assist global nuclear deployment efforts as a competitive fuel services provider.

2050 Nuclear Enrichment and Fuel Requirements

• Existing and near-term potentially available U.S.-based enrichment by Centrus and Urenco of ~8.8 million separative work units (SWU) is far short of potential advanced nuclear demand for HALEU by 2050 (36 to 71.2 million SWU).

• To operate 250-490 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, the U.S. will require a bounding range of 31.4 to 96.5 million SWU, necessitating total geopolitically secure enrichment services five- to tenfold greater than near-term available domestic capacity.

• Current global capacity of ~60 million SWU is insufficient to meet total LEU and HALEU needs in 2050 (81 million to 137 million SWU) as the global nuclear fleet grows.

• Current global uranium mine production of ~49,000 metric tons per year must also increase by two- to fourfold to meet world uranium requirements of 106,500 to 187,400 tons per year by 2050.

Policy Strategies

Building resilient nuclear fuel supply chains for the United States

1. Prioritize targeted federal funding for projects that can credibly grow to deliver full commercial production.

2. Establish a HALEU bank at the Department of Energy to purchase and sell HALEU at commercial scale.

3. Leverage federal electricity procurement in support of U.S. advanced nuclear deployment to build an order book of domestic nuclear projects and establish firm market demand for future fuel.

4. Securely improve cross-government coordination on the availability of stockpiled nuclear materials potentially usable for nuclear fuel production.

5. Resolutely maintain the ban on imported Russian uranium.

6. License new enrichment and fuel manufacturing facilities through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 18 months for known designs and facility types.

7. Devote federal research efforts and public sector investment to innovative, more efficient enrichment techniques like laser enrichment.

8. Expand state and federal mapping programs that seek to identify domestic uranium resources.

9. Invest in spent fuel recycling and reprocessing, with appropriate safeguards.

10. Pursue efficiency improvements and new breeder reactor technology that reduce nuclear fuel and enrichment needs.

11. Work with allies and international partners to secure U.S. uranium imports.

12. Update Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations to create avenues for sourcing uranium for energy sector use from tailings at abandoned uranium mine sites.

Enhancing international nuclear cooperation on securing supplies of nuclear fuel

1. Establish agreements to address current and future uranium needs among a consortium of like-minded nations, based on shared alignment regarding fuel sourcing and supply concerns.

2. Pursue joint research efforts and co-investment focused on new uranium production and innovation opportunities in uranium exploration and mining.

3. Share best practices for efficient and effective regulation and licensing of uranium production and enrichment projects.

4. Revise international and bilateral agreements to improve access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, particularly technologies used in nuclear fuel production.

5. Develop secure and effective frameworks for spent nuclear fuel management, including spent fuel exchange and take-back between countries.

6. Establish international HALEU banks to create strong market demand signals and secure HALEU supply for new nuclear projects.

7. Expand and facilitate international scholarship in nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, and related disciplines to foster global development of a robust skilled technical workforce.