What Can the U.S. Learn from Chinese Nuclear Deployment?

While the United States generates the most nuclear energy globally, China is far ahead when it comes to the construction of new nuclear reactors. There is currently 35GW of generation, or 30 nuclear plants, being constructed in China—more than the rest of the world combined. But China is not just winning in terms of scale; it is leading in advanced technology deployment as well. China’s Linglong-1, or ACP-100, is the world’s first commercial small modular reactor (SMR) that has passed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) general safety review and is expected to be connected to the grid by the end of 2025.

In contrast, the United States has delivered little new nuclear capacity in the last three decades, and its most recent projects, Vogtle Units 3 and 4, faced massive delays and cost overruns.

There is consensus about how China has been able to build new nuclear faster than the rest of the world—industrial supply chain capacity combined with top-down strategic policy has dramatically expedited the growth of the Chinese nuclear industry. For nuclear supporters in the United States, there is also a consensus that the U.S. must learn from Chinese success. But, what lessons can be drawn? And, where will the U.S. need to pursue alternative strategies to accelerate nuclear deployment safely and effectively?

Some elements of China’s success—its top-down policy-making, direct public financing of new reactors, and low construction labor costs—are not likely to be repeatable, or even attractive, for the American nuclear industry. However, the United States can learn from China’s predictable licensing pathways, healthy support for financing, and focus on modular construction practices. Ultimately, China and the United States have dramatically different political economies, and what works in one place might not work in the other, but China’s success offers invaluable insights for the American nuclear industry to scale.

Learning From China’s Nuclear Licensing

Unlike the United States, China employs a state-led national strategy to allocate resources and plan future infrastructure projects. Whereas the U.S. nuclear sector is made up of private developers seeking license approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), every nuclear plant built in China is included in the “national strategy” ahead of its licensing and permitting process. When a nuclear project is proposed in China, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) establishes a subsidiary with the sole task of constructing the project and then operating the reactor. To date, China has never cancelled or denied a nuclear project after the State Council approved it as part of the national strategy.

Such a top-down approach to nuclear licensing is obviously impossible in the United States. There is no American national strategy that dictates the next 5 or 10 years of infrastructure construction. However, certain practices of Chinese nuclear licensing and regulation can be and should be adapted and applied in the U.S.

Technology-inclusive rulemaking

While first-of-a-kind (FOAK) reactor builds are notoriously difficult to license anywhere in the world. China’s licensing regulations are generalized enough to accommodate technological development. The safety review regulation for reactor licensing is only 13 pages, and the regulatory framework for nuclear facility design totals 62 pages. The Chinese National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) reviews the application on a case-by-case basis, which does not force projects to jump through hoops that only apply to other technologies. Advanced reactor applicants have a slightly different application form from more traditional reactors, and do not need to demonstrate how their reactors are safe in contexts that are only applicable to older, larger reactors. Ultimately, the Chinese NNSA understands that advanced reactors are typically far safer, and should not be forced to demonstrate unnecessary safety steps during licensing.

On the other hand, the United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) licensing pathways, mainly 10 CFR Parts 52 and 50, both over 100 pages, were designed for traditional nuclear reactors originally built over half a century ago. This forces advanced reactor applicants to seek exemptions under these rules, requiring extra effort from both the applicant and the NRC staff and causing unnecessary delays.

Improving licensing of advanced reactors is already a priority in the U.S. context. The NRC is finalizing its Part 53 rulemaking to be risk-informed, technology-neutral, and performance-based. Part 53 will be the best of a “case-by-case” approach due to flexible performance objectives, while licensing decisions can be referenced in the future to speed things up. It is imperative to make Part 53 as predictable and flexible as the Chinese regulatory framework, such as allowing for alternative quality assurance programs, accepting flexible risk evaluation methodology other than Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), to be more compatible with Parts 50 and 52. The NRC must make Part 53 a clear, modern, and usable pathway to enable the efficient and timely licensing in the United States.

Predictability and Timeliness

While licensing might appear to be more streamlined and smoother in China than in the U.S., the Chinese nuclear licensing process is actually more complicated and bureaucratic. National strategy-making does offer more predictability that a project will ultimately be approved, but investors and developers must still wait years for final approval. For example, it took 18 years for the Gen IV reactor, Shidaowan, to go from proposal to operation (See Figure 1). Still, the licensing process was predictable enough that the project crew was prepared to start construction—known in the industry as reaching “first concrete day” or FCD—immediately after local State Council approval and the issuance of the construction permit from the national government.

19 out of the 30 (63%) Chinese nuclear plants that are currently under construction broke ground (i.e., reached FCD) within a couple of weeks of the issuance of a national construction permit or approval from the State Council, whichever arrives later. This indicates a much more streamlined—albeit not the fastest—licensing approach that does not leave developers in a licensing purgatory when a national regulatory agency approves a project, but a local agency does not, or vice versa.

Meanwhile, in the United States, approval from a state Public Utility Commission (PUC) can take months or even years after receiving a construction permit from the NRC. PUCs need to sign off on the final authorization to start a project, but they often don’t begin review until the project receives NRC approval, creating a licensing lag before FCD. Also, after the final approval, projects in the United States struggle to hire and mobilize thousands of workers. For example, Kairos received its construction permit for Hermes in December 2023 but could not break ground until July 2024. Similarly, Vogtle received its construction permit from the NRC in February 2012, but FCD for both reactors was not until 2013.

While some of the predictability of China’s nuclear licensing depends on continued top-down planning that is unique to the Chinese case, other aspects, like communication between national regulators and the State Councils, and between investors, developers, local communities, and other stakeholders, can be modified into American nuclear licensing to help promote efficiency and predictability.

To promote better predictability in the U.S. context, the NRC and PUCs should work together to issue construction permits and project authorizations in tandem. The NRC can also accelerate efficiency by fully implementing the performance-based Part 53 rule, streamlining environmental review, and removing uncontested mandatory hearings. Even if the NRC can take these steps, the U.S. nuclear licensing regime will likely be less predictable than China’s, but it can definitely be more efficient and faster. States have also started to streamline permitting by creating offices to consolidate processes and accelerate local approvals.

Lessons from Lower Rate Financing

In China, large SOEs are responsible for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, which they do through a joint venture with local utilities, other electricity companies, or universities, depending on the specific project. In this way, SOEs can leverage more capital to build more projects with financial risks shared by other stakeholders. Crucially, these projects benefit from state-bank financing with low interest rates. While Chinese nuclear finance is diversifying, the debt ratio of Chinese nuclear projects is around 70% to 80%, at interest rates as low as 1.4%--far lower rates than companies in other nations can secure. China National Nuclear Corporation’s (CNNC) average cost of debt is 3-4%, and the floating rate could go down with a further decrease of the national loan prime rate set by the People’s Bank of China.

In the United States, financing cost is a huge barrier for nuclear projects. Financing cost for a nuclear plant refers to the total expense of debt and equity financing, and the interest rate is highly correlated with the cost of debt. Because nuclear projects require massive upfront investment and long construction timelines, borrowing costs can account for up to two-thirds of a project's total cost when the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is as high as 9%. Lowering the cost of capital is therefore critical to attract new investors and to assuage developers’ and utilities’ concerns about financial and construction risk.

While the U.S. cannot offer the state ownership structures, milestone-based financing incentives that incrementally reduce interest rates when project milestones are achieved on time can encourage timely project completion and help nuclear developers to establish an orderbook. The Department of Energy’s Loan Program Office (LPO) can provide loan guarantees and create a precedent for the private sector to follow. Coupled with investment tax credit (ITC), a milestone-based program could reduce financial risk while respecting market structures and private-sector decision-making. What’s more, state-level policy can step in by switching to Clean Energy Stands to make nuclear eligible for low-interest financing programs.

Taking Cues from Chinese Construction Approaches

Core Designs and Modular Construction

To reach nuclear at scale, China chose to build multiple types of reactor technologies, while developing a “core design” for each reactor type to better build the Nth-of-a-kind via “learning-by-doing”. For example, China has built and improved the Hualong One (HPR-1000) design over 10 domestic reactor builds, plus multiple overseas, while simultaneously building two CAP-1400 reactors with plans to build more in the future. For SMRs, China recognizes the value of modular construction and has already fabricated an integrated module for the Linglong-1 project, an important step toward making future SMR production resemble an automated assembly line.

A standardized “core design” can avoid inconsistent fuel and parts supply and reduce redundant workforce training, and streamline licensing reviews, which improves industry safety standards and reduces costs. China’s nuclear planner witnessed how nuclear power pioneers, such as the United States and Russia, used inconsistent reactor designs for nuclear power, which ultimately increased construction and operation costs, and made each project FOAK.

But, instead of choosing a single “core design” and trying to build as many of that reactor type as possible, the Chinese nuclear industry has developed a “core design” for multiple reactor technologies that can fit the needs of different locations and needs. According to a report by Orient Securities, “The same model should be built in batches of about 6 to 10 units to maximize industry benefits.” To enhance this strategy, China is gradually building up a nuclear supply chain with a focus on making the main components of its reactors domestically. Over the past two decades, China has prioritized domestic manufacturing of key reactor components, increasing local content from about 50% in the early 2000s to over 90%.

For the United States, it is unrealistic for the government to focus on one or even just a couple of advanced nuclear technologies. However, with the correct incentives, the market will naturally filter the most successful standardized designs. The US already has a “core design” for the AP-1000, and can adopt a more modular approach focused on iterative improvement. Modular assembly can reduce construction costs and improve efficiency without relying on overworked labor. To support this strategy, the United States should strengthen the domestic supply chain through subsidies or targeted policy levers. At the same time, restrictions on imported fuels or critical components could slow industry growth and increase uncertainty for actual nuclear deployment.

Intensive Labor and Workforce

The workforce is the backbone of China’s nuclear deployment speed. Typical construction workers are usually in their early 20s with a limited educational background who work long hours. Multiple shifts—including night shifts—are the norm during construction, especially immediately following FCD. Labor in China is relatively cheap, reducing costs for nuclear developers, and laborers often work under minimal labor regulations. For example, during the construction of Tianwan Station in 2023, workers had to move materials at night to maintain continuous progress. 900 workers stayed on-site through the Chinese New Year, the country’s most important national holiday, to complete the dome lift on schedule.

Nuclear plant construction in China and the United States is equally labor-intensive. At peak construction, Vogtle 3 and 4 had more than 9,000 workers on site, similar to large Chinese projects, but at a significantly higher cost. A nuclear construction worker in the United States earns roughly $80,000 per year, while a similar worker in China only earns around ¥80,000 (~$12,000).

However, the US workers are more protected through unions. The U.S. nuclear industry employs roughly 19% unionized labor—one of the highest unionized rates among all energy sources in the U.S. Overseen by the NRC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the U.S. nuclear workforce has collective bargaining rights, regulated working hours, and enforceable workplace standards, and does not work the same extended shifts as its Chinese counterparts.

American nuclear developers should not seek to replicate the low-cost, high-risk labor practices found in China. For nuclear construction workers, the U.S. should retrain and mobilize skilled labor from adjacent heavy industries if possible. In the meantime, the U.S. should focus on expanding operational nuclear workforce pipelines through apprenticeships and university programs that bring in high-skill, efficient workers who can help expedite construction and further improve American reactor builds. Cultivating a new generation of licensed operators, reactor engineers, and maintenance specialists will be critical to sustaining long-term plant performance and reliability.

International Partnerships

Over the past decade, China has been exporting its nuclear technology as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has already constructed six reactors in Pakistan and plans to build around 30 overseas reactors by 2030. China’s nuclear exports accelerate its construction learning curve for developers by allowing for more projects in the short term. It also strengthens China’s global nuclear presence, builds diplomatic and commercial relationships, and creates opportunities for learning and standardizing reactor designs across multiple countries.

Building cooperative relationships with Western allies, such as the UK and France, can help American nuclear developers in ways other than exporting reactors. The US can strengthen multilateral nuclear partnerships and diversify the nuclear supply chain, such as by collaborating with the U.K. or France to access their established nuclear fuel recycling capabilities. In the long run, the U.S. should aim to export more reactors, which can similarly expand U.S. construction experience and drive down the future cost for US domestic nuclear deployment. In this way, the U.S. will be a more appealing partner for other countries, both for purchasing reactor designs and for expanding broader nuclear cooperation.

Adapting to the U.S. Context

China’s recent success in constructing nuclear reactors follows years of work to build a full nuclear industrial ecosystem. Planners accepted that early projects would be difficult and costly, but committed to pushing through, and now, China benefits from faster builds and lower costs.

The U.S. can’t replicate this overnight, but it must invest in developing its own nuclear ecosystem at every layer. Trump’s May executive orders calling for NRC reform, streamlined environmental reviews, more efficient licensing, and the deployment of 300GW of new nuclear energy by 2050 are a good start, but the US needs thorough support from coordinated policy, capital, and institutional resources. Specifically, the US needs to:

• Create a predictable and efficient regulatory framework

• Generate national-level demand for new nuclear plants by committing to purchase electricity through long-term market contracts, providing developers with firm orders and revenue certainty

• Incentivize timely project completion through milestone-based financing mechanisms

• Seek “core designs” and improve through iterative production, and promote modular construction practices

• Develop a skilled, resilient workforce through training programs and university pipelines

• Build strategic international partnerships to diversify the supply chain and accelerate learning

The US cannot and should not copy China’s labor intensity or state-directed planning, but it can learn from China’s modular construction, predictable approval processes, and strong financial incentives. Adapting these lessons to the US context can support efficient nuclear energy deployment and help usher in a new age of American nuclear power.